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In her essay on Robinson Crusoe Virginia Woolf searches for a metaphor to capture her sense of the 
power of Defoe’s novel. She settles on what would be, in any normal setting, a banal household 
object: a plain earthenware pot. Woolf is thinking of the moment in the novel when Crusoe, who lacks 
dry storage for his first cereal harvest, works out how to make a rough pipkin: “No joy at a Thing of 
so mean a Nature was ever equal to mine,” says Crusoe, “when I found I had made an Earthen Pot 
that would bear the Fire” (Defoe 2007, 103). Not only has Defoe’s hero solved his storage problem, 
he can now boil up broth. These apparently instrumental ends have a wider artistic significance for 
Woolf. The maker’s knowledge that Crusoe acquires as he fashions the pot fixes a whole order of 
representation. This order encompasses the narrator’s sublime solitude, and somehow makes real the 
vast spaces that isolate him. “By believing fixedly in the solidity of the pot and its earthiness”, Woolf 
explains, Defoe “has subdued every other element to his design; he has roped the whole universe into 
harmony”. In all this, the correspondence between the unrefined power of Defoe’s narrative and 
Crusoe’s rude manufacture is strongly implied: 
To dig, to bake, to plant, to build — how serious these simple occupations are; hatchets, 
scissors, logs, axes — how beautiful these simple objects become. Unimpeded by comment, 
the story marches on with magnificent downright simplicity. (Woolf, 75, 74) 
Woolf’s reading of Crusoe is as resonant as ever in the twenty-first century. Her choice of a plain clay 
pot to stand in for Defoe’s novel anticipates later material-cultural turns: it encourages us to retrofit a 
theory to the thing. Cynthia Wall focuses on the “joy at a Thing” that some other Crusoeian objects – 
raisins, umbrellas – seem to emit: they “give out their pleasures because they are reality and, unlike 
God’s signs, are made by Crusoe himself (...) Things were standing in a light of their own and, on 
their own in texts, generated their particular cultural heat” (Wall 112). Ilse Vickers identifies Crusoe’s 
material world with the “history of trades” projects undertaken by the early Royal Society: both were 
“preoccupied with the ‘world of things’ and (...) it is not just ‘things’ but more specifically ‘the 
making of things’ that demands his attention [and] affects the style of his narrative” (Vickers 127). By 
showing how for Defoe “simple objects” like the earthenware pot belong to a continuous conceptual 
order with the ‘simple occupations” by which they are made and used, Woolf reminds us how these 
objects (as Nigel Thrift puts it) “do far more than represent” (Thrift 239). Crusoe’s pot might almost 
have the power to form, rather than simply reflect, an unfolding understanding of its maker’s world 
(Tilley 318-22).  
When Vickers categorizes Crusoe as homo faber, and Woolf connects the things he makes to 
the “magnificent downright simplicity” of Defoe’s novel, they are making bold connections between 
material craft and literary making, and they do so for argumentative effect. There is no doubt that 
their pronouncements get at something near the heart of Robinson Crusoe. They touch on the 
pleasure-yielding urges to make and to accumulate for which its narrative gives such effectively 
regulated provocation and satisfaction. But the straightforwardness that is so important for Woolf’s 
and Vickers’s statements needs qualification. While Defoe was of course a projector and a practical 
progressive, he was also a satirist, and there is an undertow of scepticism and irony in his treatment of 
mechanical processes that runs hard against the novel’s optimistic swell.  
This essay argues that these counter-currents are crucial to its literary effect. We will look at 
three reasons for questioning the received account of Crusoe as homo faber, or handicraftsman-hero. 
Our first point is largely contextual. Defoe comments often on artisans and manufacturers in his 
journalism, both before and after he writes Robinson Crusoe, but he does so invariably with contempt. 
This contempt seems to be at odds with readings like those of Vickers and Woolf. It is not that Defoe 
thinks skilled craftsmen have no place within the modern world. He thinks simply that their 
knowledge is stagnant, and that their way of viewing things is inert. Manufacturers, like Crusoe on his 
island, can generate material surplus, but they have no means of giving it meaningful value. They 
cannot translate wealth into riches – only merchants and factors can do that. Critics have dealt with 
this idea when exploring the economic implications of Robinson Crusoe, but its significance for the 
material culture that the novel expresses remains unclear (Novak; Watson). This leads to a second 
point. Woolf’s rhapsody on an earthenware pot tempts us to forget that Crusoe insists, often with 
curious elaboration, on the unloveliness of nearly everything that he makes. Defoe’s deployment of 
special linguistic resources to describe the ugliness of his hero’s manufactures raises a critical 
problem. Why is he so resistant to the more common material culture narrative, that processes of 
making have their own natural tendency to improvement, refinement, and even to beauty? 
(Greenhough 121) A third point involves a tentative answer to this question. When Defoe writes about 
making things, there is always an implication that he is also thinking about other things: the making of 
money, of knowledge, of political states. To whatever extent economics, information or statecraft are 
made analogous with handicraft, questions about the relation of form to function are bound to arise, 
and those questions are soon aestheticized. Robinson Crusoe is read often as an allegory of politics in 
the age of party. The evidence adduced in this essay suggests that it is both more and less than that, 
and that the affordances of political meaning that are offered up by the material culture it describes 





In the text of Robinson Crusoe itself there is evidence at least of an ambivalent attitude to the value of 
mechanical expertise and material practice. The long sequence of heroic handiworks that Crusoe 
pursues in the middle of the novel casts a warm light over it, and can make it difficult to assess, but 
the general sentiment is consistent. In the first instance, Crusoe is careful to identify himself as 
belonging to a rank significantly above that of the artisan or manufacturer, in order to distinguish 
himself from that class. The assumption is there in the report of his father’s declaration 
that mine was the middle State, or what might be called the upper Station of Low Life, which 
he had found by long Experience was the best State in the World, the most suited to human 
Happiness, not exposed to the Miseries and Hardships, the Labour and Sufferings of the 
mechanick Part of Mankind, and not embarass”d with the Pride, Luxury, Ambition and Envy 
of the upper Part of Mankind. (Defoe 2007, 6) 
In addition to its main message about social rank, this passage sets up an important narrative premise 
for the rest of the novel: that Crusoe is a blank slate as far as knowledge of manufacturing processes is 
concerned. This will mean that his experiences on the island are available to prove, later on, that any 
technical art can be mastered by reason alone (so long as there is enough time). In these early sections 
of the novel Defoe works hard to keep his hero innocent of mechanical knowledge, as though he were 
conscious that a young man seeking his fortune in the great world would be more likely than not to 
pick some up. During his early trading expeditions Crusoe is able always to ship himself as a 
gentleman, “so I neither had any Business in the Ship, or learn”d to do any”, and he presents this 
omission in retrospect as regrettable and a little odd (Defoe 2007, 16). But it means that he can 
reserve himself from hands-on work to learn only the most rational and mathematical parts of 
navigation during a later voyage, “how to keep an Account of the Ship’s Course, take an Observation; 
and, in short, to understand some things that were needful to be understood by a Sailor” (Defoe 2007, 
17). Even during his time as a captive in Africa Crusoe avoids acquiring manual skills. He turns out to 
be unusually lucky as a fisherman, which sets up his eventual escape on his master’s fishing boat. But 
hunting for food in not a banausic activity, and he loses no status by it (Peacham 12-13: “if a Noble 
man borne in captiuitie, or constrained through any other necessitie, shall exercise any manuall 
occupation or Art, hee by the opinion of some, loseth his Nobilitie Ciuill, but not Christian”; compare 
Xenophon, 414-5 [4.2-3]). The slaves with whom Crusoe works, by contrast, have mechanical skills 
that seem almost to substitute for their identities. One is a very good swimmer, which means that 
Crusoe can push him off the escape-boat with an apparently clear conscience (Defoe 2007, 21). The 
other, the boy Xury, has a natural dexterity that seems if anything to guarantee his servitude. Crusoe 
remarks that Xury “was a much better workman than I” at, for example, the slaughtering and skinning 
of wild animals, but this unexpected manual aptitude, rather than humanizing Xury in Crusoe’s mind, 
contributes something decisive to the license that he takes in selling him on as a slave a few pages 
later (Defoe 2007, 26).  
The opening pages of Defoe’s novel suggest that Crusoe considers “the mechanick Part of 
Mankind” to be degraded socially. This is an opinion that one would not expect, perhaps, from 
someone modest enough to claim only “the upper Station of Low Life” for themselves. In several of 
Defoe’s writings of the 1720s one finds evidence that this was a settled prejudice of Defoe’s. In The 
Complete English Tradesman (1725) he has special scorn for any slow-witted person who aspires to 
make their fortune in the merchant’s fast-paced trade:  
he should have been the Manufacturer, not the Factor; he should have stood by the Shuttle 
and the Warping-Mill, not come to the Buying and Selling; indeed he is a kind of natural 
Mechanick, viz. Nature cut him out to be a mere Mechanick, not a Tradesman; to make the 
Work, not buy and sell it; and his is out of his Element when he is out of the Loom (Defoe 
1975, 236-7) 
This sort of “thick-headed Wretch” is in fact no better than a weaver’s shuttlecock himself, good only 
of repetitive movement, incapable of improvisation or evolution. It is particularly interesting to see 
Defoe using the phrase “natural Mechanick” here with such clear derogatory intent. The negative 
connotation was less obvious when he had used the same colligation six years earlier in Robinson 
Crusoe. As Robinson sets about making a table he admits that “I was yet but a very sorry Workman, 
tho” Time and Necessity made me a compleat natural Mechanick soon after, as I believe it would do 
any one else” (Defoe 2007, 62). Here “natural Mechanick” sounds like an admirable thing to be, but 
in both cases the technological and social context is significant. We know from the Essay on Projects 
that Defoe was particularly admiring of mechanical looms. In a passage where he doubts that any 
serious technical progress has been made since the discovery of gunpowder, printing and the compass, 
he admits that one invention “owes more to true genuine contrivance, without borrowing from any 
former use, (...) a mechanic engine contrived in our time called a knitting-frame”. But Defoe is alert to 
the potential that this truly progressive machine has for degrading its operators, and for creating new 
divisions in the social hierarchy. Two years later, when making a survey of the working portion of 
British society in A Plan of the English Commerce, Defoe placed “mere drudges” at the bottom of the 
scale, and one small step above them “those who, tho” labouring perhaps equally with the other, have 
yet some Art mingled with their Industry, and are to be particularly instructed and taught how to 
perform their Part, and those are called Workmen or Handicrafts” (Defoe 1728, 12; compare Defoe 
1726, 12: from “Apprentices to Merchants, Wholesale-Men, and the like, I must descend to the 
Apprentices of meaner Tradesmen, and yet not to the labouring Trades neither, that is to say, the 
Handicrafts, Artificers, and the like...”). Such workmen were distinct again from the instructors and 
guides of the industry – “these are call”d Artists, Mechanicks or Craftsmen” – and the “Dealers” or 
merchants who are one step in turn above them. In Crusoe what Defoe seems to be imagining is a 
“natural Mechanick” who rises to the capacity of artist-craftsman without passing through the 
intervening stage of “instructed” handicraftsman. He becomes a master without stooping to the 
mastery of any one mechanical process. This is a fantasy of mechanical expertise that cannot be taken 
seriously by anyone with experience of manufacturing processes, and Defoe is clearly presenting it as 
a constructive fiction, if not positively as an ironic impossibility. 
Some important passages in Robinson Crusoe become easier to interpret when one applies to 
them these distinctions – of workmen from artists, of undertakers of handicrafts from true craftsmen. 
In each case, the most striking thing is the care with which Defoe divests Crusoe’s workmanship of 
intrinsic value. There is no glimmer of recognition here that skilled manual arts might involve any 
especially valuable extension of cognitive processes through haptic experience, or any other personal 
knowledge of the material world. All suspicion of mystery – in the mechanical sense of the word of 
which Crusoe makes almost figurative use when he recalls letting Friday “into the Mystery, for such it 
was to him, of Gunpowder” (Defoe 2007, 187) – is removed from his island workshop: 
as Reason is the Substance and Original of the Mathematicks, so by stating and squaring 
every thing by Reason, and by making the most rational Judgment of things, every Man may 
be in time Master of every mechanick Art. I had never handled a Tool in my Life, and yet in 
time by Labour, Application and Contrivance, I found at last that I wanted nothing but I could 
have made it, especially if I had had Tools; however, I made abundance of things, even 
without Tools, and some with no more Tools than an Adze and a Hatchet, which perhaps 
were never made that way before, and that with infinite Labour: For Example, If I wanted a 
Board, I had no other Way but to cut down a Tree, set it on an Edge before me, and hew it flat 
on either Side with my Axe, till I had brought it to be as thin as a Plank, and then dubb it 
smooth with my Adze. It is true, by this Method I could make but one Board out of a whole 
Tree, but this I had no Remedy for but Patience, any more than I had for the prodigious deal 
of Time and Labour which it took me up to make a Plank or Board: But my Time or Labour 
was little worth, and so it was as well employ”d one way as another. (Defoe 2007, 59) 
The language that Defoe uses here is one of open explication (“stating and squaring”) and rational, 
systematic specification, even though the communicative context that one would expect for those 
actions – of instruction and apprenticeship – is irrelevant to Crusoe’s current circumstances. The list 
of “Labour, Application and Contrivance” is presented as complete in its sufficiency. There is no 
component of personal expertise, however, to connect rational “Contrivance” – a word that we have 
seen Defoe use in the Essay on Projects to denote the most original and progressive forms of 
invention – back to the basic categories of bodily “Labour” and ethical “Application”. The rhetorical 
weighting of these sentences feels almost willfully clumsy and ill-contrived. Complete control and 
easy attainment are boasted in the same breath that barely practicable levels of toil are confessed. At 
one moment Defoe wants Crusoe (who has “never handled a Tool in my Life” and suspects that he 
could have got along “even without Tools”) returned to a state of pre-technical primitivism. At the 
next he overturns the conjecture by admitting how much more how much more he could do “if I had 
had tools”. Tools are the objects that encode most efficiently the mechanic gestures and techniques of 
successive generations of manufacturers, and those are precisely the sorts of traditional knowledge 
that Defoe is trying to downplay in this passage. The notion of cutting down a tree to make a single 
plank is especially, even conspicuously absurd, especially given that he has all the tools necessary to 
make boards by wedging and hammering. Defoe must have been conscious of this absurdity, given 
that elsewhere he reports a similar practice in certain remote Russian communities as a peculiar 
curiosity (Defoe 1728, 36: “in Russia and Muscovy, when for want of Commerce, La- bour was not 
assisted by Art; they had no other Way to cut out a large Plank, but by felling a great Tree, and then 
with a multitude of Hands and Axes hew away all the Sides of the Timber, till they reduc”d the 
middle to one large Plank”). Everything in this passage is at the service of Defoe’s vision of a 
completely rational and yet completely unskilled process of manufacture. But Crusoe can only attain 
to it by a total devaluation of his personal “Time” and “Labour” – the very variables by which the 
“worth” of real manufacturers is usually assessed. The economic logic of production here can go in 
only two directions: towards systems of factory automation that were still largely the stuff of fantastic 
“projects” in 1719; or towards systems of enslaved labour. 
The denigration of skilled manufacturing in Crusoe and elsewhere is the negative side of a 
positive tendency: Defoe’s enthusiastic championship of merchants and dealers. With its trans-global 
scope, its focus on specially required kinds of knowledge, and its distinct political implications, the 
productive logic of Crusoe is consistent with pronouncements on similar subjects that Defoe was 
making at the beginning of the century. Take for example the manifesto for free trade that he 
published in The Review in 1706: 
The artificers or handicrafts-men are indeed slaves; the gentlemen are the plowmen of the 
nation, but the merchant is the support and improver of power, learning and fortunes. A true-
bred merchant is a universal scholar, his learning excels the mere scholar in Greek and Latin 
as much as that does the illiterate person that cannot write and read. He understands 
languages without books, geography without maps; his journals and trading voyages delineate 
the world... He is qualified for all sorts of employment in the state by a general knowledge of 
things and men... (Defoe 1951, 124-5) 
The allusion to slavery is figurative and comparative, but it anticipates the logic of sovereignty and 
control that plays out in Crusoe. It is consistent also with Defoe’s later rationalistic rejection of skilled 
expertise: just as Crusoe is a manufacturer without mechanical instruction, so Mr Review’s merchant 
had been a geographer without maps, a linguistic without books. Nullius in verba is their shared 
motto. Manufacturers, like husbandmen in lucky climates, can produce abundance and riches, but 
they depend upon the universal scholarship of the tradesman, by whose agency alone those riches can 
be translated into a universal “wealth” (that is, into exchange value): “What was the land in 
Barbadoes good for”, asks Mr Review, “when the island was unpossessed by us? It was as rich as 
now, the fund was there,––but that trade gave that fund a value. It was a fund and no fund––a fund of 
nothing” (Defoe 1951, 112-3). When Defoe writes of “the fund” he means the foundation or bottom 
of a potential trade – he is using the same special sense of the word that he deploys in the introduction 
to The Compleat English Tradesman, when he proposes “to describe the English or British Product, 
being the Fund of its inland Trade, whether we mean its Produce as the Growth of the Country, or its 
Manufactures” (the passage is quoted to illustrate “fund, n. 6” in the OED; Defoe 1727, 5). But it is 
clear that he is playing with other recently developed financial senses of the word as well: this fund 
will produce no funds, no instruments for further investment, no stock for exchange. It is a word that 
Defoe puts under even greater stress in Robinson Crusoe when Friday speculates on the “wonderful 
Fund of Death and Destruction” that must be concealed within Crusoe’s most significant instrument, 
his gun – a different “fund of Nothing”, one might say (Defoe 2007, 178). In each of these passages 
Defoe presents a different aspect of a quintessentially modern paradox: that the tangible things people 
grow or craft or manufacture will, from now on, have an arbitrary relationship with all the really 
important circulations of value that are defined in terms of capital, credit and wealth. All that is solid 





In the last section we reviewed evidence that Defoe understood a distinction between manufacturing 
processes that show, on the one hand, elements of rational determination and, on the other, those that 
do not, because they are mere handicrafts, constituted only by haptic skills and social inheritances. 
There is some consistency in the negative rhetorical weight that Defoe applies to the latter category of 
manufacturing work. This section will look in more detail at the way Defoe represents Crusoe’s 
manufactures. It focuses in particular on the theme of ugliness or clumsiness that runs through many 
of these descriptions. I want to argue that there is a positive reason for this emphasis on ill 
contrivance, having to do with the function of Robinson Crusoe as a sort of prototypical 
enlightenment conjectural history. Defoe wishes to present a scheme of material production in which 
the bare components of manufacture – labour, raw materials, instrumental ends, time – are always 
legible and deducible to the reasoning observer. He is careful to make sure that there is no intervening 
layer of purely personal knowledge, of artisanal mystery, of refinement or ornament, that might 
obscure this conjectural vision. 
Ugliness is the guarantee that Defoe offers his readers of the traceability of Crusoe’s 
achievements on the island to their most basic components. During the first few years of residence on 
the island Crusoe directs his work towards living and growing things: plants and animals to eat, 
hedges for protection, caves for shelter. These simple objects, like the conventionally contrived things 
that Crusoe rescues from his ship, are generally treated as givens or necessities that do not warrant 
much evaluative comment. It is when Crusoe begins to make his own pots out of the island’s earth, 
pots that he hopes will allow him to store up a reserve stock of grain, that he begins to insist on his 
shortcomings as a maker: “It would make the Reader pity me, or rather laugh at me, to tell how many 
awkward ways I took to raise this [clay] paste, what odd misshapen ugly things I made (...) I could not 
make above two large earthen ugly things, I cannot call them Jarrs, in about two Months Labour” 
(Defoe 2007, 102). The reader’s commiseration is begged again when Crusoe begins to make 
clothing: “I made most piteous work of it” (Defoe 2007, 114). When Crusoe manages to contrive the 
firing of his pots, producing “three very good, I will not say handsome Pipkins”, it is as though Defoe 
seeks to highlight the life-changing usefulness of these objects by presenting them in terms of raw 
functionality, hedged around by a tangle of negative constructions: “After this Experiment, I need not 
say that I wanted no sort of Earthen Ware for my Use; but I must needs say as to the Shapes of them, 
they were very indifferent” (Defoe 2007, 103). In a particularly heightened passage Crusoe offers a 
“Scetch of my Figure” that returns insistently to the shocking effect created by his home-made fur 
clothes: they have “a most barbarous Shape”, especially when complemented by his whiskers, which 
were “of a Length and Shape monstrous enough” (Defoe 2007, 127). These protests about ugliness of 
form persist even when Crusoe begins to report improvements in his skill as a maker a few pages 
later: 
Besides this, I arriv”d at an unexpected Perfection in my Earthen Ware, and contriv”d well 
enough to make them with a Wheel, which I found infinitely easyer and better; because I 
made things round and shapable, which before were filthy things indeed to look on. But I was 
never more vain of my own Performance, or more joyful for any thing I found out, than for 
my being able to make a Tobacco-Pipe (...) tho” it was a very ugly clumsy thing (...) (Defoe 
2007, 122) 
In each of these passages the words with which Defoe describes Crusoe’s manufactures, and insists on 
their unattractiveness, have the same new-made uncouthness and awkwardness as their referents. 
Crusoe calls his pipe “clumsy”, for example, a word he uses again for his umbrella a few pages later 
(“a great clumsy ugly Goat-Skin Umbrella”, Defoe 2007, 127). Ben Jonson had singled out the word 
for use by the ridiculous Tibullus in Poetaster (1601) as a grotesque new coinage (“clumsy 
chilblained judgment” – usually “clumsy” meant stiffened with cold) (Jonson 1995 [V.280], 240). 
Developing the oddness of the word further, Defoe anticipates the earliest transference of the word 
recorded in the OED to describe awkwardly-made objects (1758) by some forty years (“Clumsy”, 
OED, 4a). The OED also indicates that “ugly” was a word that retained terrible and horrible 
associations in the early modern period, and that “filthy” (“filthy things indeed to look on”) was 
usually reserved for similarly violent descriptions of dirt or squalor (“Ugly”, OED, especially 2b and 
6a, which cited Defoe; “Filthy”, OED, 2). Defoe’s use of “shapable” to signify good form, quoted 
above, is the earliest recorded in the OED (“Shapeable”, OED, 2). It is likely that Crusoe’s first 
readers would have been more sensitive to the rough novelty of these usages than we are, and perhaps 
more understanding of the way Defoe is aligning new-made words with newly-contrived things. We 
can still get a sense, however, that he is placing a special emphasis on these designations and ideas. 
By insisting on the filthiness of his manufactures he is saying something specific about their 
elementality, their nearness to the unimproved or natural states of mud and branch and fur. At the 
same time he is showing that there is something astonishing about their attainment to recognizable 
and sufficiently useful form while they are still so close to that elemental stage.  
The introduction of a potter’s wheel strikes a discordant note in the main passage quoted 
above. It is curious that Defoe gives no explanation for how he contrives it, especially given that he 
had written previously in his journal of the impossibility of making “the Iron Gudgeons for the 
Spindle or Axis of [a] Wheel to run in”: “I had no Notion of [the pattern for a wheel], neither did I 
know how to go about it” (Defoe 2007, 64). But the wheel does fit in with an aspect of Crusoe’s 
experience that is often noticed by commentators. Although Crusoe arrives on the island empty 
handed, his efforts to survive on it, and his later triumph over all incomers, depend entirely on 
technologies imported from the Europe, such as iron tools, woven textiles and firearms. Most of these 
he rescues from the wreck of his own and another ship. What Defoe presents sometimes as a narrative 
in which a one-man culture of manufacture evolves from nothing depends in fact on an artificial head 
start. Crusoe is ready to acknowledge how crucial his lucky find of tools is for his survival. Defoe also 
gives an extra hint of its significance by prefiguring it in an earlier part of the novel. When Crusoe 
arrives in the Brasils and begins to establish his ingenio or sugar factory, he sends to London for 
credit banked with his landlady. She returns it to him in the form of goods, and the merchant who 
advises her includes in the shipment, “without my Direction (...) all Sorts of Tools, Ironwork, and 
Utensils necessary for my Plantation, and which were of great Use to me” (Defoe 2007, 33). 
Throughout the book iron equipment proves necessary to Crusoe, and that necessity is entirely 
unanticipated. Defoe is emphasising again the directness of Crusoe’s encounter with the experience of 
making, its lack of personal mediation. One notices that Defoe lets us catch Crusoe trying to 
downplay the significance of the technological mediation provided by his tools – for example, when 
he reports that  
I improv”d my self in this time in all the mechanick Exercises which my Necessities put me 
upon applying myself to, and I believe cou”d, upon Occasion, have made a very good 
Carpenter, especially considering how few Tools I had (Defoe 2007, 122).  
The allusion in this passage to Joseph Moxon’s Mechanick Exercises, Or, the doctrine of handy-works 
(1677-80 as serial; second volume on printing, 1683), the most comprehensive account available to 
Defoe of the basis for technological progression in artisanal practices, has a note of irony about it. 
Crusoe falls a long way short of the “curious” expertise towards which Moxon describes each of his 
mechanical trades developing. In these passages Defoe mixes rueful acknowledgments of his lack of 
skill with barely convincing protestations about the “unexpected Perfection” (Defoe 2007, 122) to 
which he progresses. His journal contains one particularly memorable distortion of retrospect, when 
his efforts to make a table lead to an acknowledgment of being “yet but a very sorry Workman, tho” 
Time and Necessity made me a compleat natural Mechanick soon after, as I believe it would do any 
one else” (Defoe 2007, 62). The phrase “compleat natural Mechanick” sounds like the title of a trades 
encyclopaedia such as Moxon’s. But the word “natural” could point in different directions: towards 
the abstraction of natural reason and philosophy, or towards the ugly and entangled practicality of 
“botching” (Defoe 2007, 114). In what sense can Crusoe, whose comfort on the island depends on 
tools developed through European synthetic crafts, be described as either “compleat” or “natural” in 
his manufacturing? 
One answer to this question – an answer that I want to explore in what remains of this essay – 
is that the persistent note of ruefulness or irony that can be heard in so many of Crusoe’s statements 
about his manufactures should make us cautious about taking his rhetoric of nature, perfection and 
completeness at face value. Without doubt Defoe invites us to read Crusoe’s experience on the island 
as an anthropological test case. It is a conjectural narrative, a thought experiment in which an 
acculturated European is returned to a nearly natural state and invited to reconstitute a comfortable, 
domestic and finally aggressively political life out of very basic (if not entirely natural) components.  
But it is important that we do not read Crusoe’s story in too Hobbesian or Rousseauian a light. It was 
not Defoe’s habit to think about social reconstitution in terms of pristine moments at which artificial 
state persons or original contracts are formed. When Defoe wrote about foundational socio-political 
forces he did so in terms of a parabolic movement, involving a retreat and a return more than linear 
evolution. He imagined politicians dipping back into the sources of original power in their polities, 
rather than stripping them down to their elements and reconstituting them. Although the arc in 
Robinson Crusoe is a long one in terms of a human life, it also describes a partial retreat into the 
primitive, rather than a total revolution. Before Crusoe this rhetoric of retreat and return is prominent 
in Defoe’s enduringly popular The True-Born Englishman (1700), which contains its own mythopoeic 
origination narrative. Before England is populated by men and women the land is home to “a devil of 
black renown”, who establishes pollution rather than purity as the foundational element of the nation: 
“From whose mixed relics our compound breed, | By spurious generation does proceed” (Defoe 1997, 
41). Defoe writes in the poem about revolutionary moments (“The Governments ungirt when Justice 
dies, | And Constitutions are non-entities”), but those moments are themselves complex, not pure: 
If to a King they do the Reins commit, 
All men are bound in Conscience to submit: 
But then that king must by his Oath assent 
To Postulata’s of the Government; 
Which if he breaks, he cuts off the entail, 
And Power retreats to its Original. (Defoe 1997, 48) 
Defoe seems to have considered the last line here, “Power retreats to its Original”, to be the most 
important one in the poem. Its resonance for him is especially evident in the important essay that he 
wrote for The Post-Man (25-27 December 1701) “The Original Power of the People of England”, 
where it is requoted and woven into the prose: “I would endeavor to make way, by retreating to 
originals, for every member to perform its proper function, in order to put the general body into its 
regular motion” (Defoe 1997, 104). Just as Crusoe dispenses with beauty of form and refinement of 
manufacture when he sets about making pots and umbrellas, so Defoe is determined not to let the 
beautiful symmetry of established institutions distract him from the process of retreat and renewal: 
“for notwithstanding all the beauty of our constitution, and the exact symmetry of its parts, about 
which some have been very elegant, this noble well-contrived system has been over-whelmed” (Defoe 
1997, 91). When incomers threaten to overwhelm Crusoe on his island, he too depends on points 
“whither I could retreat upon Occasion” (Defoe 2007, 217), “a Place of Security, and such a Retreat 
as I wanted” (Defoe 2007, 151) – and a “safe Retreat”, moreover, “where, I dare say, no Savage, had 
he been at the Mouth of it, would be so hardy as to venture in” (Defoe 2007, 149). Just as Defoe does 
withhold tools from Crusoe in his state of near-nature, the original to which Crusoe retreats at 
moments of crisis is not elemental: it is itself pre-prepared, well constituted, built and supplied. 
So Crusoe’s earthenware pot, the symbol of solidity and earthiness by which Defoe, in 
Virginia Woolf’s account, “has roped the whole universe into harmony”, may not have quite the 
power to bring order and beauty that she supposes. An investigation of the language and figuration 
with which Robinson Crusoe represents the material world suggests a prevailing movement of 
thought that is more recursive than the one described by Woolf, and more resigned to the ugliness and 
irregularity that appears when providence is viewed from partial, human perspectives: “still as we are 
all the Clay in the Hand of the Potter”, Crusoe catechizes, “no Vessel could say to him, Why hast thou 
form”d me thus?” (Defoe 2007, 177). It may be that a better artisanal symbol for Defoe’s novel, and 
one to which he was drawn often, is that of a checker-work surface, of the sort one might see on a 
marquetry chess board or a tessellated pavement. “How strange a Checquer Work of Providence is the 
Life of Man!” exclaims Crusoe, “and by what secret differing Springs are the Affections hurry”d 
about as differing Circumstances present!” (Defoe 2007, 132, and see endnote on 291). In the closing 
pages of the novel he sums it up as “a Life of Providence’s Checquer-Work, and of a Variety which 
the World will seldom be able to show the like of” (Defoe 2007, 256). This imagery corresponds with 
Defoe’s words in the preface to the novel, which stresses diversion and plurality, and sets out his aim 
to “justify and honour the Wisdom of Providence in all the Variety of our Circumstances” (Defoe 
2007, 3). In early modern homilies checker-work was a common symbol for mixed experience of joy 
and sorrow in human life: “Gods Providential Dealings with his people in this world”, wrote the 
Baptist minister Hercules Collins in 1684, “is like Chequer-work, there is the dark, as well as the light 
side of Providence, the most Refin”d and best State and Condition of the best Saints are mixed” 
(Collins 1684, 28; Bury 1693, 16). As we have seen, Defoe attributes to the trader (though never to 
the maker) a capacity to synthesize at least some of that complexity: “the merchant by his 
correspondence reconciles the infinite variety which, as I noted, has by the infinite wisdom of 
Providence been scattered over the face of the world” (Defoe 1951, 125). In the confined space of 
Crusoe’s island this variety is brought within bounds, so that certain hesitant experiments in rational 
making can be carried out, where the maker can be free from the pressures of time, and of the 
endlessly varied possibilities offered by a navigable world. In Robinson Crusoe Defoe does not offer a 
fully worked out vision of natural crafts and mechanics built up from first principles. He needs his 
hero to be more various and inconsistent than that. Crusoe shows himself to us as both thoughtful and 
short-sighted, attentive to the world and inattentive, skilled and clumsy, equipped with tools and yet 
half-naked. We expect that Defoe has set out to write a conjectural history of life stripped back to its 
most simple elements, but the story he delivers instead is a narrative of retreat that remains involved 
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